Abstracts
Plurality vs proportional electoral rule. (Job Market Paper)
Working paper published in the peer reviewed IVIE series (WP-AD 2009-14), in the IEB working paper series (WP 2009/27) and in the proceedings of SMYE 2009. Submitted to the European Journal of Political Economy.
ABSTRACT: This study compares the representativeness of voters in the proportional electoral system with the situation under plurality rule. Representativeness is commonly measured by comparing parties' received votes with their shares of seats in the Parliament; this implies that proportional rule should always better represent voters. A coalition within the Parliament, however, rules the country without interference and supports the government; when a coalition is formed, the pivotal role of small parties and the proposal right of the formateur can significantly impact the distribution of power. Focusing on the coalition formation stage, I demonstrate that the proportional rule is more representative only under very specific conditions. If these conditions are not met, introducing some distortions in the distribution of seats among parties can actually improve representativeness.
Economics of Education Review, conditionally accepted for publication, October 2009.
Working paper published in the peer reviewed IVIE series (WP-AD 2009-10).
ABSTRACT: A widely accepted result in the literature is that the majority of voters are against the introduction of universal vouchers. Chen and West (2000) predict that voters' attitudes towards selective vouchers (SV) may be different. Their claim is that voters are indifferent between the no-voucher and SV regimes, unless competition leads to a reduction in the education price. This paper shows that, when public schools are congested, the majority of voters are in favour of SV. Furthermore, SV induces a Pareto improvement. In equilibrium, the introduction of SV induces a reduction in income stratification at school, with some relatively poor students attending private schools.
Tax evasion and itemised deductions
Fiscal Studies, revision requested.
ABSTRACT: I propose a way to reduce tax evasion through the use of itemised deductions. The consequent rise in tax proceeds (due to the enlargement of the tax base) allows financing deductions at no expense to the government (and allows reducing tax rates net of deductions).
Federalism and liberalisation: a political economy model
Work in progress with Federico Boffa (U. di Macerata), and Enrico Colombatto (U. di Torino, ICER and Collegio Carlo Alberto).
ABSTRACT: The paper analyses conditions under which an initially centralised country may decide to switch to a decentralised (federal) system. We identify two types of decentralisation: real decentralisation (powers are actually transferred to the periphery), and phony decentralisation (consisting of a multiplication of bureaucracies without any powers actually being transferred). We assume that decentralisation occurs if the politician leading the (initially) centralised country agrees to it. The politician is interested in the probability of re-election and in office benefits (larger under centralisation and phony decentralisation). Voters are imperfectly informed about the politician's actions. We find that phony decentralisation, which allows more rent-seeking, is more likely to occur in good states of the economy; while otherwise the politician has an incentive towards true decentralisation, since this increases the chances of being reelected. In average economic situation, the politician has an incentive to preserve the centralised status quo.
