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## FIELDS OF INTEREST

Political Economy and Public Economics, Game and Auctions Theory, Regulation, I.O.

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## EDUCATION

- 2008 PhD, Economics, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)  
Thesis: *Essays in Public Economics*;  
Supervisor: Philippe De Donder  
External Committee: Jordi Massó, Pierre Pestieau, Domenico Siniscalco  
Internal Committee: Georges Casamatta, Helmuth Cremer
- 2003 Master in Economics, U. Bocconi (Milano)
- 2002 BSc (*four-year Laurea*), Economics (with distinction), U. di Torino  
Dissertation: *Analysis of the European UMTS auctions*  
Supervisor: Pietro Terna
- 2001 BA (*four-year Laurea*), Business and Economics (with distinction), U. di Torino  
Dissertation: *Internet, information & competition dynamics*  
Supervisor: Domenico Siniscalco
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## PUBLICATIONS AND SUBMITTED PAPERS (DETAILS IN PAGE 3)

- Plurality vs proportional electoral rule: which is most representative of voters?*, IVIE working paper: WP-AD 2009-14; submitted to American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; **Job Market Paper**
- Tax evasion and itemised deductions*, Fiscal Studies (revise and resubmit)
- Education and vouchers*, Economics of Education Review (conditionally accepted for publication)
- The regulation theory and its perspective* (with David Bardey), in ENI Encyclopaedia of Hydrocarbons, vol. IV, Chapter 6.2, pp. 351-366, Treccani editor, 2007
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## WORK IN PROGRESS (DETAILS IN PAGE 3)

- Federalism and liberalisation: a political economy model*, with F. Boffa and E. Colombatto (2009)
- Federalism and labour liberalisation*, with F. Boffa (2009)
- The impact of CAFE on the car's market*, with F. Boffa and D. Haddock (at preliminary stage)
- Media for electoral purposes*, with F. Schuett (at preliminary stage)
- Financing education: a political economy model* (at preliminary stage)
- Quality discrimination in the educational market* (at preliminary stage)

## TEACHING AND WORK EXPERIENCE

- 2008 - 2010 Visiting Assistant Professor, U. Alicante; *Mathematics* (Undergraduate 1st & 2nd year, Spanish); *Microeconomics* (Undergraduate 2nd year, English)
- 2008 Visiting fellow, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
- 2004 - 2008 T.A., U. Toulouse 1; *Microeconomics* (Undergraduate 1st, 2nd & 3rd year, French)
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## SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS

Italian, 1 year scholarship for starting the graduate studies abroad (2003-04); Scholarship for graduate studies, Fondazione Invernizzi (2002-03); *G. Giolitti award* for BSc. dissertations, U. di Torino (2001-02)

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## OTHER ACTIVITIES

Referee for *Public Choice* (1)  
Member of the internal *comité* for the Ph.D. defence of Lari A. Viianto, Universidad de Alicante.

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## CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS

**2009**: Association for Public Economic Theory - Annual conference; European Public Choice Society - Annual Conference; IDEP - VIII Journées Gérard-Varet (LAGV); XIV Spring Meeting of Young Economists; Summer School in Public Economics (Universidad de Barcelona). **2008**: Collegio Carlo Alberto - ID workshop. **2007**: Scottish Economic Society - Annual Conference. **2006**: IDEP - V Journées Gérard-Varet (LAGV). **Invited Seminars**: U. de Alicante (2009), Antwerpen U. (2008), U. Autònoma de Barcelona (2008), U. Bicocca di Milano (2007), Toulouse School of Economics (2006)

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## LANGUAGES

Fluent in English, French, Spanish. Native in Italian. Beginner in Dutch and Portuguese

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## REFERENCES

**Philippe De Donder**

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## PLURALITY VS PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL RULE.

**Job Market Paper.** Working paper published in the peer reviewed *IVIE series* (WP-AD 2009-14), in the *IEB working paper series* (WP 2009/27) and in the *proceedings of SMYE 2009*. Submitted to American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

**ABSTRACT:** This study compares the representativeness of voters in the proportional electoral system with the situation under plurality rule. Representativeness is commonly measured by comparing parties' received votes with their shares of seats in the Parliament; this implies that proportional rule should always better represent voters. A coalition within the Parliament, however, rules the country without interference and supports the government; when a coalition is formed, the pivotal role of small parties and the proposal right of the *formateur* can significantly impact the distribution of power. Focusing on the coalition formation stage, I demonstrate that the proportional rule is more representative only under very specific conditions. If these conditions are not met, introducing some distortions in the distribution of seats among parties can actually improve representativeness.

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## EDUCATION AND VOUCHERS

*Economics of Education Review*, conditionally accepted for publication, October 2009.

**ABSTRACT:** A widely accepted result in the literature is that the majority of voters are against the introduction of universal vouchers. Chen and West (2000) predict that voters' attitudes towards selective vouchers (SV) may be different. Their claim is that voters are indifferent between the no-voucher and SV regimes, unless competition leads to a reduction in the education price. This paper shows that, when public schools are congested, the majority of voters are in favour of SV. Furthermore, SV induces a Pareto improvement. In equilibrium, the introduction of SV induces a reduction in income stratification at school, with some relatively poor students attending private schools.

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## TAX EVASION AND ITEMISED DEDUCTIONS

*Fiscal Studies*, revision requested.

**ABSTRACT:** I propose a way to reduce tax evasion through the use of itemised deductions. The consequent rise in tax proceeds (due to the enlargement of the tax base) allows financing deductions at no expense to the government (and allows reducing tax rates net of deductions).

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## FEDERALISM AND LIBERALISATION: A POLITICAL ECONOMY MODEL

Work in progress, written with Federico Boffa (U. di Macerata), and Enrico Colombatto (U. di Torino, ICER and Collegio Carlo Alberto).

**ABSTRACT:** The paper analyses conditions under which an initially centralised country may decide to switch to a decentralised (federal) system. We identify two types of decentralisation: real decentralisation (powers are actually transferred to the periphery), and phony decentralisation (consisting of a multiplication of bureaucracies without any powers actually being transferred). We assume that decentralisation occurs if the politician leading the (initially) centralised country agrees to it. The politician is interested in the probability of re-election and in office benefits (larger under centralisation and phony decentralisation). Voters are imperfectly informed about the politician's actions. We find that phony decentralisation, which allows more rent-seeking, is more likely to occur in good states of the economy; while otherwise the politician has an incentive towards true decentralisation, since this increases the chances of being reelected. In average economic situation, the politician has an incentive to preserve the centralised status quo.